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Introduction
Many people feel that the European Union is
unreasonably and even undemocratically complicated.
It is, after all, an elementary feature of democracy that
those who are subject to the law should know where it
comes from. EU rules, however, seem to emanate
mysteriously from cloud-covered “Brussels”. The
European Convention promises to clarify the reasons
and the authors of European laws – for that is what they
are, and may now at last come to be called. Yet, even as
people may feel they are on the verge of understanding
European law, they are told that there are other European
processes which shape their lives but which are not laws
and are not in the hands only of the EU institutions. It
is not necessarily reassuring.
To promise too much simplicity, however, will not
help either. Even if a new constitutional treaty provides
a simpler framework, European governance is going to
remain a complex matter. We are not going to establish
a clear “delimitation” between EU and national
competences. We will continue to have a system in
which there is cooperation rather than separation between
levels, and the division of responsibilities is made more
by function than by sector. And to make things even
more difficult, there will be grey areas in which the
Member States retain legislative competence but where
the Community can act – including by legal instruments
– but only to provide supporting measures excluding
harmonisation. Nor is there going to be a simple
opposition between a “Community method” and
“intergovern mentalism”. To be sure, there is a “pure”
Community method by which the Commission has the
exclusive right of initiative, the Council decides
(preferably by qualified majority) with the participation
of Parliament (ideally codecision) and the whole thing
is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. Yet even
within the Community there are major differences in
how things are done, and in many areas policy is
formulated and implemented through a mixture of
methods both legal and non-legal, European and
national, public and private.
A difficult series of balances must be struck – and
explained – if we are going to respond appropriately to
this challenge. This tension is well reflected in the
European Commission’s December 2002 Report on
European Governance. On the one hand, the Commission
urges “more focused European institutions with clearer
responsibilities” supported by improved “bottom-up
involvement in EU policy shaping and implementation”.
Yet it also argues in favour of “widening the choice of
instruments to respond to new governance challenges”.1
The Commission’s June 2002 Action Plan on
Simplifying and Improving the Regulatory Environment
thus talks of establishing mechanisms which will make
it easier
“to choose the most appropriate instrument or
combination of instruments (of both a legislative
and non-legislative nature) from the wide range of
options available (regulation, directive, recom-
mendation, co-regulation, self-regulation, voluntary
sectoral agreements, open coordination method,
financial assistance, information campaign)”.2
The main aim of this article is to explain roughly
what is involved in these different ways of doing things.
After a flashback to recall some the main reasons why all
these new methods have emerged, it outlines the main
features of two areas in which self- and co-regulation are
significant: environmental agreements and the social
dialogue. It then gives an overview of the very different
ways in which the “open method of coordination” is in
fact being pursued. The final section then addresses
some of the main issues which have been raised regarding
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the effectiveness and legitimacy of these new methods,
and looks to the future.
1. A Brief Look Back
Long gone indeed are the days when the only choice for
pursuing a Community objective was law, and law was
adopted according to one main procedure. There has
been a constant but uneven strengthening of
“supranational” processes, notably the extension of
qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council and the
strengthening of the European Parliament’s role in
decision-making, first with the “cooperation procedure”
and then through the creation at Maastricht and
subsequent extensions of “codecision”. In parallel, there
have been a series of tendencies leading away from
simple reliance on the law.
Completion of the internal market itself was made
possible not only by QMV but  also by the move away
from detailed European harmonisation through adoption
of mutual recognition and the New Approach, by which
legislation was limited to defining “essential require-
ments” of health and safety while leaving the detailed
technical specifications to standardisation bodies. In
other words, progress was achieved by a combination of
more efficient legislation (both in process and content)
with decentralisation and voluntary standards.
As the single market programme was implemented,
political consensus was more or less reached on the twin
principles of subsidiarity – the Community should only
act where this is necessary or more effective than action
at the level of the Member States (or regions) by virtue
of the nature of the objective to be achieved; and
proportionality – Community action should be as
limited as possible and leave as much flexibility as
possible while ensuring fulfilment of the objectives. In
other words, only as much law should be adopted as was
strictly necessary.
The process of Economic and Monetary Union then
served as an example of convergence and multilateral
surveillance, prompting new forms of non-binding
policy coordination in other areas, a process strongly
influenced also by the spread into public administration
and policies in the 1990s of the ideas of management by
objectives and benchmarking. At the same time, effective
implementation of major Community policies was seen
to demand new forms of participation. In the structural
funds, the doubling of resources was accompanied by
new forms of partnership with sub-state and private
actors, while environmental policy gave increasing
weight to the involvement of stakeholders.  Finally,
Community policy has had to come to terms with
increasing diversity. Integration has increasingly touched
on sensitive issues such as social policy, where there are
strong differences in national structures and legal
harmonisation has been considered both unnecessary
and unacceptable.
The various “new methods” which have emerged
from all this are often lumped together in a rather
indiscriminate way. A basic distinction can be made,
however, according to the nature of the main actors who
are involved in each case:
• forms of interaction between Community processes
and private actors, which are generally referred to as
“self-regulation” and “co-regulation”; and
• forms  of non-binding policy coordination which
take place mainly between national governments
and administrations, with some role for the EU
institutions, which are widely referred to as
constituting an “open method of coordination”.
2. Self-regulation and Co-regulation
A common language is only now beginning to be
developed regarding self-regulation and co-regulation
in the EU context. The common feature is the existence
of some form of relationship between binding legislation
and voluntary agreements in a particular area, but many
different concepts and modalities can be observed.
A loose distinction is frequently made between more
“top-down” and more “bottom-up” approaches.
“Bottom-up” approaches consist of self-regulation
which is initiated by stakeholders themselves (perhaps
with a bit of prompting by the Commission) but which
still takes place under the  shadow of the law. The
relationship can be simply one of Euro-acknowledge-
ment of autonomous self-regulation in a particular sector
or profession. So long as the resulting agreements do not
conflict with European law or other policies, it may not
seem necessary for anything at all to be done by the EU
institutions, or indeed by national authorities. In other
cases it is more a case of the institutions and governments
not being able to regulate alone, as in the case of
consumer protection in electronic commerce, where
self-regulation is understood more in terms of Codes of
Conduct for Online Businesses, Trustmarks and
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms.
More “top-down” approaches include the use of
standards – that is, voluntary measures which are adopted
within the framework of legislative acts, in the spirit
of the New Approach – and the implementation of
Directives by voluntary agreements. The Commission’s
June 2002 Action Plan on Simplifying and Improving
the Regulatory Environment is quite clear that what the
Commission, at least, understands as “co-regulation” is
essentially a means of implementation. This mechanism
can offer advantages. It may “be appropriate in cases
where flexible and/or urgent measures are necessary,
provided that they do not require a uniform application
in the Community and that they do not affect the
conditions for competition”; and it can draw on the field
experience of the parties concerned. However, it should
only be used on the basis of a legislative act, and can be
replaced by further legislation if necessary.3 This is not
a view which is shared by everyone, and a lively debate
can be expected.
The following sections aim to give an idea of the
present state of play concerning these kind of procedures
by looking briefly at two cases in which self- and co-
regulation already have a significant European
experience: environmental agreements and the Social
Dialogue.4 Eipascope 2003/1 http://www.eipa.nl
Environmental Agreements
Voluntary agreements have long been explored at
national level in the environmental area. European
policy has also tried to incorporate such agreements, as
part of an overall strategy in which stakeholder
involvement and behaviour change are seen as essential
elements. The 5th Environmental Action Programme of
1992 thus proposed a “reinforcement of the dialogue
with industry and the encouragement, in appropriate
circumstances, of voluntary agreements”. The Council,
ratifying this programme, noted that “... the involvement
of all levels of society in a spirit of shared responsibility
requires a deepening and broadening of the range of
instruments to complement normative legislation
including, where appropriate, market-based and other
economic instruments, research and development,
information, education and training, financial support
mechanisms, voluntary schemes”.4 Ten years later, a
similar “strategic integrated approach” is being pursued
under the 6th Action Programme.5
General voluntary agreements at European level
have been few: the eco-label award scheme (1992 -
revised 2000) and voluntary participation by organisa-
tions in a Community eco-management and audit scheme
(EMAS) (1993 - revised 2001). There have been various
efforts, however, to establish mixes of legislation and
voluntary measures in specific cases. An early example
was detergents, where the goals are not only a decrease
in poorly biodegradable organic ingredients, which
depends on change in manufacturing, but also reductions
in energy use and in consumption per capita of detergents
and packaging. These require changes in consumer
behaviour which can be assisted through labelling,
information and educational programmes. Community
legislation to this effect existed, but in the mid-1990s,
the European association AISE adopted a Code of Good
Environmental Practice, leading to a 1998 Commission
Recommendation6 intended “to enhance the effective-
ness and to guarantee the transparency and credibility
of this industry commitment”, which specifies targets
for each of the main objectives and committed all parties
to monitor and report.
An illustrative case of the perceived interplay
between negotiation and legislation is that of energy
efficiency. After the 1996 “Refrigerator Directive”,
negotiated agreements became more accepted, and the
Commission had by 2000 negotiated two agreements
with manufacturers (of TV and video recorders, and
washing machines). According to its 2000 Action Plan,
a large number of appliances would be subject to such
agreements, but a framework directive was still desirable.7
The Commission’s 2002 argument is a perfect summary
of this approach:
“Negotiated agreements can present some advan-
tages compared to regulation fixing mandatory
standards. They can provide for quick progress due
to rapid and cost-effective implementation. They
allow for flexible and adjusted adaptation to
technological options and market conditions… The
adoption of a legislative framework on energy
efficiency requirements would reinforce the
potential impact of negotiated agreements by the
industry. Being aware that the Community disposes
of an efficient tool to set  rapidly energy efficiency
requirements through the adoption of implementing
directives, the industry could either conclude
satisfactory self-commitments or support compul-
sory requirements where it is clear that too many ‘free
riders’ would not sign for the agreed targets and so
doing would undermine the competitiveness of the
manufacturers volunteering to comply.”8
Perhaps the best known case is the European strategy
to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars, with its
three pillars of fuel economy labelling of cars; the
promotion of fuel efficiency by fiscal measures; and
commitments of the automobile industry on fuel
economy improvements. The first is addressed primarily
by law: the 1999 “labelling” Directive on the availability
of consumer information on fuel economy and CO2
emissions.9 The second requires agreement by the
Member States to introduce differentiated taxation
systems. The third is being pursued by negotiated
agreements which were reached in 1999 and 2000 with
European, Korean and Japanese Manufacturers
Associations, which give recognition to the commitment
given to the Commission by those bodies to achieve
specified emission targets.
Packaging and packaging waste constitute a special
case. The 1994 Directive was the first effort to apply the
New Approach to environmental issues. It sets the
“essential requirements” which must be fulfilled, while
the corresponding detailed technical specifications are
to be drafted by standardisation bodies. Compliance
with the essential requirements is presumed through
compliance with harmonised standards or, in their
absence, with relevant national standards.10 This process
has been somewhat controversial. The Commission
issued a mandate to the European Committee for
Standardisation (CEN), which in 2000 approved five
standards. These, however, met with formal objections
from Belgium and Denmark. Three were subsequently
not published at all, and one only accompanied by a
warning that it did not cover all the essential
requirements. A new mandate has been given and CEN
has drawn up new draft standards which were undergoing
internal consultation in February 2003.11
In the context of the June 2002 Action Plan, and in
the light of specific environmental concerns, the
Commission has tried to clarify things. The July 2002
Communication on Environmental Agreements at
Community Level12 suggests three categories of
agreement where Commission action may be necessary
(as compared to spontaneous decisions of stakeholders
in areas where the Commission has no intention of
proposing legislation):
• self-regulation which is acknowledged at Community
level by means of a Commission Recommendation
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• self-regulation which is acknowledged by a Commis-
sion Recommendation which is accompanied by a
monitoring Decision;
• co-regulation, in the sense of environmental agree-
ments which are concluded in the framework of a
legislative act in order to implement its “essential
aspects”.
It also puts forward both a number of basic legal
conditions for environmental agreements and a set of
“assessment criteria” applicable for both self- and co-
regulation: cost-effectiveness of administration (that is,
also taking into account the comparative administrative
costs for the Community institutions!); representati-
veness of the parties concerned; quantified and staged
objectives; involvement of civil society; monitoring
and reporting; sustainability; and incentive compati-
bility (i.e. consistency with other policies in terms of
signals given to participants in the agreement).
If these conditions are met, may we see more proposals
providing for implementation by negotiated agreement?
The first case was the 2000 End-of-life Vehicles Direc-
tive.13 A nearly identical formula is used in the Directive
on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE)
signed by the European Parliament and the Council on
27 January 2003:
“3. Provided that the objectives set out in this
Directive are achieved, Member States may transpose
the provisions set out in Articles 6(6), 10(1) and 11
by means of agreements between the competent
authorities and the economic sectors concerned.
Such agreements shall meet the following
requirements:
(a) agreements shall be enforceable;
(b) agreements shall specify objectives with the
corresponding deadlines;
(c) agreements shall be published in the national
official journal or an official document equally
accessible to the public and transmitted to the
Commission;
(d) the results achieved shall be monitored regularly,
reported to the competent authorities and the
Commission and made available to the public
under the conditions set out in the agreement;
(e) the competent authorities shall ensure that the
progress reached under the agreement is
examined;
(f) in case of non-compliance with the agreement
Member States must implement the relevant
provisions of this Directive by legislative,
regulatory or administrative measures.”14
Social Dialogue
The Social Dialogue is perhaps the classic case of
interplay between European legislation and private
negotiation. In this case the social partners, in addition
to their own autonomous dialogue, not only must be
consulted by the Commission on social-policy
initiatives. They may end up agreeing between
themselves a text which can be transformed, without
change – and without discussion by the European (or
any other) Parliament – into European law.
This dates back to the mid-1980s, with the 1985 “Val
Duchesse” initiative of Jacques Delors to promote
industrial relations at the European level. The Single
European Act introduced a new article stating that “The
Commission shall endeavour to develop the dialogue
between management and labour at European level
which could, if the two sides consider it desirable, lead
to relations based on agreement.” In 1991 an Agreement
on Social Policy was concluded between 11 Member
States (not the UK) and attached to the Maastricht
Treaty. This was introduced into the body of the Treaty
(new Articles 138 and 139) at Amsterdam in 1997. It
states that “The Commission shall have the task of
promoting the consultation of management and labour
at Community level and shall take any relevant measure
to facilitate their dialogue by ensuring balanced support
for the parties.” Before submitting proposals in the
social policy field, the Commission shall consult
management and labour, first, on “the possible direction
of Community action”, and then, if Community action
is considered advisable, on “the content of the envisaged
proposal”. On the occasion of such consultation,
management and labour may inform the Commission
that they wish to initiative a dialogue at Community
level which “may lead to contractual relations, including
agreement”. Those agreements can be implemented
either by “procedures and practices specific to manage-
ment and labour and the Member States” or by a Council
Decision on a proposal from the Commission.
The main “cross-industry” or “interprofessional”
bodies which meet in the Social Dialogue Committee
are:
• the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confede-
rations of Europe (UNICE), which now has a
cooperation agreement for this purpose with the
European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises (UEAPME);
• the European Centre of Enterprises with Public
Participation (CEEP); and
• the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).
There are also now 27 Sectoral Social Dialogue
Committees bringing together workers and employers
in particular areas.15
Figure 1 shows the steps and options involved in the
process foreseen by Articles 138 and 139 as well as the
results to date under this procedure.16
The results are not impressive, at least in quantitative
terms: three cross-industry agreements and two sectoral
agreements which have been implemented through
Council Directives; and three sectoral agreements which
have been implemented through collective agreements.
Significantly, the Social Partners chose, for the first time
in the case of a cross-sectoral agreement, to implement
the 2002 Framework Agreement on telework by the
“voluntary route”,  rather than a Council Directive. The
Work Programme of the European Social Partners for6 Eipascope 2003/1 http://www.eipa.nl
2003-2005 which was presented in November 2002
their intention to develop a work programme for “a more
autonomous social dialogue”17, which does seem to
involve a desire to come out from under the shadow of
the law. A recent exchange may be symptomatic. The
Commission in December 2002 sent to the Social Partners
a consultation document concerning stress at work. The
latter responded with a joint letter in January 2003
indicating that such a consultation was inappropriate
since, as stated in the joint work programme, they
planned to reach a voluntary agreement themselves.
The Social Partners are not asking for any change in the
formal arrangements – indeed they have proposed to the
Convention that the text of Articles 138 and 139 should
be incorporated, as they stand, into the new Treaty.18
However, this may largely be out of fear of finding
something worse at the next IGC if they don’t hold on
tight to what they have.
Figure 1 – the European Social Dialogue
The Commission consults the social partners (cross-industry or sectoral) two times:
1. is there a need for European action?
2. if so, what is the possible direction of such action?
Social Partners do not
choose to negotiate
Community legislation
Social Partners
choose to
negotiate themselves
most cases
Negotiations fail to
produce an
agreement
Negotiations lead
to a European
Agreement
temporary
agency work
2001
parental leave 1995
part-time work 1997
seafarers’ work 1998
civil aviation 2000
agricultural work 1997
telework in telecom 2001
telework in commerce 2001
telework cross-sector 2002
Commission
presents legislative
proposal
Social Partners ask
Commission to
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Council
Directive of
EP and Council
or
Council Directive with
consultation of EP
Text endorsed by a Council Directive
with no formal consultation of EP
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civil aviation work      2000
Implementation through
national procedures
(i.e. collective agreements
at national level
or national and company level)
Commission checks
legality,
representativeness
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2. The Open Method(s) of Coordination
Various forms of non-binding policy coordination are
usually, and rather misleadingly, lumped together as
“the open method of coordination”. To be sure, there are
common features. There is a desire to do something at
European level, but harmonisation is considered both
politically unacceptable and unnecessary; the process
is one of convergence of national policies towards
common objectives following common guidelines,
rather than the establishment of a common policy; and
the emphasis is more on policy learning than on legal
enforcement. However, there are important differences.
The starting point was the Maastricht Treaty’s
provisions for achieving Economic and Monetary Union.
Economic policy coordination has remained largely
non-binding, with the central instrument being the
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) and the
system of multilateral surveillance. The procedure
follows an annual cycle. The Commission draws up
recommendations each year which are submitted to the
ECOFIN Council. ECOFIN presents a draft to the
European Council, which adopts conclusions, and the
BEPGs are then formally adopted by the ECOFIN
Council in the form of a recommendation following the
June European Council. Country-specific recommenda-
tions may be made by the Council on a recommendation
from the Commission where it is considered that a
Member State’s policies “risk jeopardising the proper
functioning of economic and monetary union”.
The first “spillover” of this approach was the
Luxembourg Process, which bears that name due to the
Extraordinary European Council on Employment held
in Luxembourg in November 1997 to push ahead with
the provisions introduced into the Treaty at Amsterdam
earlier that year. Guidelines and targets were agreed for
each of the four “pillars” of employability, entre-
preneurship, adaptability and equal opportunities. These
have been modified every year since and at Lisbon in
March 2000, in addition to the “vertical” objectives, the
Member States agreed on quantifiable “horizontal”
objectives for the overall employment rate. The annual
cycle has been as follows. The Commission proposes
Employment Guidelines. The Council adopts the
Guidelines after the December European Council. In the
spring of each year, Member States incorporate the
guidelines into National Action Plans (NAPs) stating
how they will transpose the guidelines into national
measures, which are forwarded to the Commission and
to the Council together with an implementation report.
The Council and the Commission present to the
following December European Council a Joint
Employment Report. The Commission also presents a
new proposal for revised Guidelines for the following
year which are formally approved by the Council on the
basis of the conclusions of the European Council. The
Council may also address country-specific recommen-
dations to individual Member States. The objective of
policy learning is also supported by a peer review
programme between Member States, organised with the
support of the Commission.
The Cardiff  Process was established soon after, in
June 1998, to improve the functioning of product and
capital markets through peer pressure and benchmarking.
By the end of November each year, the Member States
submit national reports. The Commission produces by
the end of each year a “Cardiff report” which is transmitted
to the Council. The Economic Policy Committee carries
out a country examination and produces its Annual
report on structural reform in March. In parallel, the
Commission produces “country fiches” which are used
as input for the structural part of the Commission’s
report on the implementation of the BEPGs. All of this,
together with the Council’s conclusions concerning the
internal market aspects of the reform process, goes
through ECOFIN to the Spring European Council and
then it is back to the Commission, as it makes
recommendations concerning the next BEPGs.
The next step, the Cologne Process created in June
1999, provides for macroeconomic dialogue at European
level. The meetings take place at technical and political
level, and bring together the Council, the Commission,
the European Central Bank and a representative of the
monetary authorities outside the euro zone, and the
social partners.
The Lisbon European Council of March 2000 was to
go furthest of all, with its definition of a “a new strategic
goal for the Union in order to strengthen employment,
economic reform and social cohesion as part of a
knowledge-based economy” and a new approach to
achieve this goal, explicitly building on the BEPGs, the
Luxembourg, Cardiff and Cologne Processes:
“a new open method of coordination as the means of
spreading best practice and achieving greater
convergence towards the main EU goals. This
method, which is designed to help Member States to
progressively develop their own policies, involves:
– fixing guidelines for the Union combined with
specific timetables for achieving the goals which
they set in the short, medium and long terms;
– establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and
qualitative indicators and benchmarks against
the best in the world and tailored to the needs of
different Member States and sectors as a means
of comparing best practice;
– translating these European guidelines into
national and regional policies by setting specific
targets and adopting measures…;
– periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review
organised as mutual learning processes.”19
The open method of coordination (OMC) was
specifically invoked at Lisbon for information society,
research policy, enterprise policy, and the various areas
involved in “modernising the European social model
by investing in people and building an active welfare
state” (education and training, employment policy,
modernising social protection, promoting social
inclusion). The result has been a rapid spread of this new
method in these, and other, areas.
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“convergence of objectives” in social protection. The
Council in mid-1992 adopted two Recommendations
on “common criteria” concerning resources and “the
convergence of social protection objectives and
policies”,20 which was indeed “a premature version” of
OMC.21 Amsterdam introduced a clause in the Treaty
permitting “measures designed to encourage coope-
ration between Member States through initiatives aimed
at improving knowledge, developing exchanges of
information and best practices, promoting innovative
approaches and evaluating experiences in order to
combat social exclusion.”22 The Council created a
Social Protection Committee in June 2000, which was
then given a legal basis in the EC Treaty as new Article
144 at Nice. This Committee elaborated a series of
common objectives which were approved at Nice in
December 2000 (and revised in December 2002).
Member States were invited to submit “a national action
plan covering a two-year period and to define indicators
and monitoring mechanisms capable of measuring
progress.”23 The first set of these “national action plans
for inclusion” (“NAPinc”) was presented in June 2001,
and an initial set of indicators was approved in December
2001. At the same time a Decision was adopted setting
up a programme of Community action to support
transnational cooperation and mutual learning.24
Lisbon’s call for a study on the sustainability of
pensions and Stockholm’s specific reference to OMC
led to a Commission Com-
munication in July 2001
outlining an “integrated
approach” combining
existing policy processes
with the open method of coordination which would, it
was argued, help Member States focus on necessary
reforms and make pensions policy more transparent,
contribute to consensus, foster mutual learning and help
measure progress on the basis of commonly agreed
indicators. Common objectives and working methods
should be agreed by the end of 2001 and national
strategy reports presented in 2002.25 Eleven common
objectives were agreed at Laeken. National Strategy
Reports were submitted in September 2002 and a first
peer review took place on the basis of these reports in
October 2002. A Joint Commission and Council Report
is to be presented to the 2003 Spring European Council.
OMC has been pursued enthusiastically in the area
of  education. The Stockholm European Council
approved a report identifying three strategic and 13
associated objectives, and requested a work programme,
which was presented at Barcelona.26 Likewise the
Council has supported a Commission White Paper on
youth which proposes to use OMC to improve
participation, information, voluntary service and
research into youth-related activities.27
In the area of research, Lisbon prompted new
initiatives both to improve national policies through
benchmarking, and to promote even more transnational
networking and cooperation. A Council Resolution of
June 2000 invited the Commission to draw up a
methodology for benchmarking national research
policies and a list of indicators covering human resources,
public and private investment, scientific and
technological productivity, and the impact of RTD on
economic competitiveness and employment. A first set
of indicators was produced by the Commission in July
2001 and a European Innovation Scoreboard was
developed. Benchmarking has also been applied to
enterprise policy, together with an Enterprise Policy
Scoreboard and a set of quantitative targets was presented
in November 2002.28 With regard to information society,
a first eEurope Action Plan was rapidly presented and
approved in June at the Feira European Council as the
“eEurope 2002 Action Plan, which set 64 targets in 11
action areas to be achieved by the end of 2002. A second
plan “eEurope 2005: An information society for all” was
approved at Seville in June 2002.
OMC has also been pursued in areas outside the
Lisbon strategy, notably in asylum and immigration.
The Commission has presented a series of Communi-
cations suggesting that the Council should approve
multi-annual guidelines accompanied by timetables,
which should be implemented through national action
plans in the “classic” spirit of OMC.29
3. Issues and Prospects
Different issues are posed by self- and co-regulation, on
the one hand, and the areas involving some form of OMC
on the other. However,
there are some common
challenges and themes. For
present purposes, they can
be divided into two groups
relating respectively to issues of effectiveness and
questions of democratic legitimacy.
Effectiveness
It is hard, as well as beyond the scope of this article, to
give an evaluation of results in the areas under
consideration. One should also exercise some care as
regards how the question is formulated. What do we
actually mean when asking whether things “work”?
In many cases there are quantitative targets and, so
long as adequate monitoring has been carried out, some
judgements can of course be made. In the case of voluntary
environmental agreements, for example, one can measure
progress. To look back to the cases cited earlier, the
Commission’s report on the intermediate results (for the
period 1996-2000) indicates that the reduction of con-
sumption of detergents and packaging is still less than
half way towards the target.30 The main findings
presented by the Commission in December 2002 concer-
ning the reduction in CO2 emissions are also mixed with
regard to the response of manufacturers. However, they
are also pretty damning regarding the performance of
Member States in complying with the law, five of them
having recently been taken to Court!31  It is not always
easy to tell which element has had most real impact.
Turning to OMC, it is likewise difficult to tell what
share in the measurable results in employment figures,
What do we actually mean when
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for example, is due to the Luxembourg process itself,
what is caused by other measures and what are matters
which public policies of any sort cannot really influence
in any predictable or measurable way.
While multilateral surveillance, peer review and so
on are undisputedly valuable, the application of
benchmarking to public policies raises important issues
of both measurement and transferability. How should
one compare “performance” – in terms of the efforts
made or the results achieved? Are the indicators
appropriate to the sector and valid across all the
countries? By way of illustration, a Commission paper
of January 2002 on the first results of attempts to
benchmark national research strategies rightly stresses
that “best practice is always context-specific and path-
dependent. There is no universal set of best practices.
Moreover, the complexity of RTD and innovation
systems is such that individual policy instruments,
applied in isolation, are unlikely to have a substantial
impact on overall performance.”32 Taken out of context,
imitation of particular policy measures can even have
negative effects. It is worth stressing that this danger
may also exist when it comes to methods of cooperation
in the EU. It may be
inappropriate to apply
techniques which work in
one sector to another.
Consumer and environ-
mental organisations, for
example, argue that
models developed for
product safety (i.e. the New
Approach) may not be
appropriate elsewhere: “In
the field of consumer
safety there is a strong
incentive for manufac-
turers to maintain a certain
level of protection as a result of product liability
legislation. This holds true at least in cases where a clear
and direct relation between a faulty product, an accident
and an injury exists. There is nothing comparable in the
environmental field.”33
What can one say, for example, about the Luxembourg
process after five years? A review was conducted in 2002
on the basis of national evaluations,34 but clear con-
clusions are not easy to reach. The process is certainly
established procedurally: It works in the sense that it
takes place regularly and has been accepted. It is still too
early to evaluate real impact on employment and, as
noted, it is difficult to evaluate what has been the
specific contribution, if any, of the Luxembourg process
itself. The process seems to have contributed to an
increase in policy coherence at the national level, as
well as  in policy prominence and the spread of “new
policy paradigms”. Has there been “policy learning”?
Yes, there have been some shifts in policy in some
countries, but much of what has happened is better
characterised as fairly marginal policy learning in
Member States which were doing these things anyway.
Finally, there are several dangers, not only that the
whole thing could become a ritualised, empty process,
but also that it could contribute to avoiding some of the
tough decisions (labour market, investment etc.) which
must be taken if there is to be real change on the ground.
Democracy, Participation and Accountability
There are also serious concerns for legitimacy. If it is
difficult for citizens to understand European law, it is
virtually impossible to see what is going on in most of
these new methods.
The problem is most acute with regard to OMC. The
procedures to be used concerning economic coordi-
nation and employment are stated in the Treaty itself. In
other cases, procedures are to a greater or lesser extent
ad hoc and unclear. As a Working Document of the
Convention’s Working Group on Economic Governance
has put it, “there is the difficulty of identifying the
players involved in the method, the procedure being in
practice essentially in the hands of high-level
committees devoid of democratic legitimacy which
formulate almost the entire content of the guidelines to
be adopted by the European Council.”35
There seems to be a large
measure of consensus in
the European Convention
that some “horizontal”
definition of OMC should
be introduced into the
Treaty.  It remains to be
seen how its nature and
scope of application will
be defined. Should it be a
procedure which applies
only in some areas? - for
example, only in those
areas in which it will be
specified that the Union
only has competence to adopt “supporting measures”.
Or should it be seen as a method which could be chosen
as a more flexible option, on a case-by-case basis, even
in areas where the Union does has legislative compe-
tence?The conclusions of the Working Group on Social
Europe generally coincide with the view of the Working
Group on Simplification, to the effect that OMC should
be given constitutional status as a means of “concerted
action by the Member States outside the competences
attributed to the Union” but that it “should not be
confused with the coordination competences conferred
upon the Union by various legal bases, notably in the
economic and employment fields.”36 In other words, the
future chapter on non-legislative measures should
specify its aims and basic elements, and it should be used
only where there is no Union legislative competence,
coordination is not already enshrined in the Treaty “or
where the Union has competence only for defining
minimum rules, in order to go beyond these rules”.37
Such an approach, strictly applied, would seem to
imply limiting this newly-defined OMC to the other
areas (if employment is dealt with separately) which are
While multilateral surveillance,
peer review and so on are
undisputedly valuable,
the application of benchmarking
to public policies raises
important issues of both
measurement and transferability.10 Eipascope 2003/1 http://www.eipa.nl
being proposed as “areas for supporting action only” in
draft Article 15(2) of the Constitutional Treaty, namely
industry; education, vocational training and youth;
culture; sport; and protection against disasters.
“Industry” in this sense, however, presumably includes
trans-European networks, enterprise policy and research
and technological development, which, as the Working
Group itself points out¸ have provisions for coordination
in the Treaty but not detailed arrangements. Application
of OMC in the social sphere other than employment
could be covered by the paragraph in the Treaty which
provides for cooperation to combat social exclusion.
The Working Group on Social Europe also makes a
number of suggestions as to how the roles of all the EU
institutions as well as the national governments and
parliaments could be clarified, which will be an essential
step in improving transparency and accountability.
Self- and co-regulation pose different questions.
Political concerns are raised even where there is clarity
of legal basis and procedure, as in the Social Dialogue.
One issue is representativeness. The broader question is
how far the procedure is acceptable at all in terms of
democratic legitimacy, especially since the European
Parliament plays no formal role. The Court of First
Instance has argued that
representative manage-
ment and labour organi-
sations can be a sufficient
source of democratic legi-
timation. Others believe
that management and
labour organisations, even
if generally recognised as
representative, cannot
represent the peoples of
Europe as a whole and
therefore are unable to
convey democratic legitimation.38
Other important questions arise for implementing
committees and agreements. Again, it is not just a matter
of the representativeness of each organisation but also
one of overall balance. Environmental and consumers
organisations thus lament an “inherent imbalance
between the resources and expertise that industry and
societal groups like consumers are able to provide for
any co-regulation exercise“.39 But how far should
European institutions go in trying to promote balanced
public participation without endangering the autonomy
of  “civil society”?
It is hard to see where else the Treaty might define a
role for private actors in decision-making as Articles
138 and 139 do for social policy. The Commission’s
2002 Action Plan and associated documents are helpful
in identifying general parameters. These may serve as
the basis for an eventual set of general EU guidelines,
but specific issues will have to be addressed in the
different areas in which self- and co-regulation are to be
used.
A Concluding Remark
European integration has come a long way since six
countries sought to create a common market through
law. After fifty years of exploration beyond the nation
state, 15, soon to be 25, countries are now preparing a
constitutional treaty which must lay down the ground
rules for cooperating in everything from a single currency
to culture diversity. It is probably a sign of health that
the process has thrown up such a wide range of options
for doing so.
Clarification of the rules is essential. Simplification
too, but only up to a point. There is not going to be a
simple match between competences and procedures –
pure Community law for exclusive EU competences, at
one extreme, and non-
binding coordination for
pure national competen-
ces, at the other.  It will
help greatly, however, to
have some more accessible
set of principles by which
people can understand and
judge the mix of ways in
which things are done. We
have a rich set of options
by which we can formulate
the ways in which we wish
to cooperate. We need to think more, however, about
where legal and non-legal instruments should be seen as
alternatives and where (and how) they are complements.
International organisations, European institutions,
the open method of coordination, are often dismissed as
mere “talking-shops”. But talking, or deliberation, is
not necessarily a bad thing. As clouds thicken in the
debate over Iraq, one recalls Churchill’s comment that
“jaw-jaw” is better than “war-war”. It may be that “jaw-
jaw” and “law-law” are also more compatible than is
often thought, at least with a view to the long term…
________________
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